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A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
The 2002 and 2008 Farm Acts increased funding for conservation programs that provide 
financial assistance to farmers to implement conservation practices on working farmland. 
Along with seeking cost-effective environmental benefits, these programs have a goal 
of spreading conservation funding equitably across States. The 2002 and 2008 Farm 
Acts strengthened this allocative goal by setting a minimum threshold for conserva-
tion funding for each State—one that exceeds historical funding for some States—for 
enrolling agricultural producers in specified conservation programs. This study uses 
conservation program data to examine evidence of the impacts of the Regional Equity 
provision of the 2002 Farm Act, and explores the tradeoffs that can occur among conser-
vation program goals when legislation gives primacy to fund allocation. The study found 
that cross-State shifts in funding reduced the acres receiving conservation treatment for 
many resource problems, but increased the net economic benefits from treatments on 
some of them. Overall impacts on the types of producers enrolled were small. 
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Summary
Federal working-land and farm and grazing land protection programs have 
long allocated program funding among States. In 2002, the Regional Equity 
provision of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (the 2002 Farm 
Act) further emphasized the allocative goal by redirecting some funding 
to States that historically had received only limited assistance under these 
programs. The Regional Equity provision mandated that each State receive 
at least $12 million per year between 2003 and 2007 for enrolling eligible 
producers in four conservation programs (the 2008 Farm Act increased 
the threshold to $15 million). This provision may sometimes work at cross 
purposes to the programs’ environmental and economic goals of helping 
farmers adopt cost-effective conservation practices. 
What Is the Issue?
Because overall program budgets were not augmented to cover the minimum 
allocation requirement, the provision shifted funding from States that 
exceeded the threshold to those below it. The provision clearly affected the 
amount of conservation funding allocated to each State in each program. 
However, because conservation programs have multiple goals, it is difficult 
to predict the effects that promoting allocative goals may have on prog-
ress toward other program goals. Key questions are whether agricultural 
producers enrolled as a result of such legislation treat similar environmental 
problems and whether their conservation actions provide environmental 
benefits as cost effectively as actions undertaken by other producers, and 
also if particular types of farmers stand to gain or lose. This study analyzes 
program data from the 2004-06 period when the 2002 Farm Act was in 
effect. Data from the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and 
the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP)—the two programs with the 
most detailed data—are used to determine whether the required reallocations 
of funds affected the ability of those conservation programs to achieve envi-
ronmental goals cost effectively.
What Did the Study Find?
The analysis revealed that the Regional Equity provision’s $12 million 
threshold requirement had unequal impacts across States. Also, it altered the 
environmental and economic outcomes differently in EQIP and WHIP, in 
ways that were not always consistent across years. Major impacts evident 
from the study were: 
•	 The Regional Equity provision reduced the number of acres that 
received treatment for many resource problems in EQIP, but this 
did not always result in a decline in net economic benefits. Changes 
in physical measures (such as acres receiving conservation treatment) 
are not always correlated with economic measures (the net economic 
benefits from conservation treatment), so it is important to measure both 
types of impacts in determining the tradeoffs arising from new policies. 
For instance, in EQIP, even though the cross-State shifts in enrollment 
induced by the provision decreased the number of acres treated for soil 
productivity and other soil erosion issues, in some years these cross-iv
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State shifts generated additional net economic benefits from improved 
soil productivity and reduced sedimentation (net economic benefits are 
calculated as gross benefits from conservation treatment minus treatment 
costs). This occurred when conservation actions benefited more people 
and when the producers in States that received increased funding (in 
order to reach the $12 million minimum) provided these benefits more 
cost effectively than producers in the remaining States. However, for 
grazing productivity and water conservation issues, the Regional Equity 
provision reduced both the number of acres receiving treatment and the 
corresponding net economic benefits from treatment in each of the 3 
years studied. 
•	 Impacts differed among programs subject to the Regional Equity 
requirements. In WHIP, the funding reallocation resulted in relatively 
large losses of both acres treated and net wildlife-related benefits (at 
least for the impacts the authors were able to measure in the continental 
United States), suggesting the provision may be having an overall nega-
tive impact on that program. Because each program targets different 
environmental problems at different costs, reducing the reallocations 
that occur in WHIP as a result of the Regional Equity provision and 
increasing reallocations that occur in the other three programs might 
increase overall net economic benefits from the four programs subject to 
the provision.
•	 The 2002 Regional Equity provision had only a small impact on 
participation by types of producers that are offered more favor-
able enrollment terms in EQIP to encourage their involvement. The 
study found that the Regional Equity provision reduced the number of 
livestock producers and increased the number of beginning and limited-
resource producers enrolled in EQIP. However, the decrease in livestock 
producers was small and did not affect EQIP’s ability to meet a legislated 
requirement that 60 percent of program funding be devoted to livestock-
related practices.
•	 The Regional Equity provision’s fixed minimum funding threshold 
means that any decreases in total program budgets will be borne 
largely by States that exceed that threshold. Because the Regional 
Equity provision is designed as a fixed set-aside and requires that each 
State receive at least the threshold amount of funding, any cuts in total 
program funds must be absorbed by States that receive more than the 
minimum funding. In contrast, program budget reductions would be 
shared by all States if the Regional Equity provision instead required that 
each State receive at least a certain percentage of total program funding. 
In the latter case, as total program budgets change, the funding for each 
State would change in proportion to the State’s specified funding share.v 
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How Was the Study Conducted?
This study uses conservation program contract data from 2004 to 2006 to 
identify the environmental, economic, and distributional implications of the 
Regional Equity provision within EQIP and WHIP, including the ability 
of the programs to deliver certain net benefits and the effect on enrollment 
patterns of certain producer groups over the period. Contract data were 
not available for the Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program and the 
Grassland Reserve Program, the other two conservation programs subject 
to the Regional Equity provision. The analysis recognizes that the lowest 
ranked (“marginally accepted”) contracts are the most vulnerable to policy-
induced budget shifts. The authors used data on these contracts, including 
the costs incurred, acres treated, and resource concerns addressed—along 
with estimates of technical assistance costs and spatially heterogeneous data 
on the benefits of treating environmental problems arising from agricul-
tural production—to estimate the impacts of the Regional Equity provision. 
Identifying the marginal contracts was particularly important because the 
lowest ranked contracts were more likely to address lower priority problems 
at higher cost. Due to limited data on the benefits of conservation treatment, 
not all conservation activity could be included in the analysis of economic 
impacts; our findings are illustrative of the tradeoffs that occur from imple-
menting the Regional Equity provision. Also, the estimates of net benefits 
were limited to program activity in the continental United States. 1 
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Introduction
Over the past 20 years, most Federal assistance for conservation activities 
on agricultural land has been directed toward taking environmentally sensi-
tive farmland out of production and enrolling it in the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP). Increasingly, however, Federal programs have sought to 
improve the environmental performance of active farms. Programs such 
as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and Wildlife 
Habitat Protection Program (WHIP) have provided financial assistance to 
producers to implement conservation practices and adopt more environmen-
tally friendly management practices. The Farm and Ranch Lands Protection 
Program (FRPP) and the Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) provide funds 
to permanently restrict conversion of farmland and grazing land to more 
environmentally damaging uses and, in the case of GRP, to restore native 
grasslands.1 The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (referred to 
here as the 2002 Farm Act) increased the combined spending for these four 
programs almost 400 percent to about $5.7 billion over the 6 years from 2002 
to 2007. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (hereafter called 
the 2008 Farm Act) authorized further funding increases, projected by the 
Congressional Budget Office to be almost $9.0 billion over the 5-year period 
from 2008 to 2012.2
The increase in funding for conservation on working lands has resulted in 
farmers’ receiving more conservation assistance through programs that, by 
design, allocate program funds broadly across the country. USDA’s Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), the agency that administers the 
working-land conservation programs, allocates program funding to State 
NRCS offices based on conservation and other criteria. These State offices set 
priorities regarding which environmental problems will receive treatment and 
make enrollment decisions. Many State offices allocate funding and program 
decisions to sub-State (county, township, or watershed) offices. In contrast, 
in the CRP general signups in which most enrollments occur, applications 
are pooled nationally and enrollment decisions are made at the Federal level. 
Although some CRP funds are targeted to particular locations, most CRP 
program funds are awarded on the basis of expected environmental benefit 
and cost criteria that do not give particular consideration to location. 
A decentralized program structure that furthers allocative goals can also 
help achieve environmental and economic goals. For example, when envi-
ronmental problems arising from agricultural production are localized and 
the benefits and costs of treatment vary across the area, decentralized deci-
sionmaking can benefit local jurisdictions economically because it lets them 
set priorities and determine solutions based on local needs and preferences 
(Peltzman and Tideman, 1972). Local decisionmaking would not necessarily 
advance the distributional goals of some conservation programs, however, 
such as ensuring that producers with different income levels and farming 
focuses have the opportunity to participate. Distributional goals, which target 
funds to particular types of farmers based on production characteristics, 
are distinguished from allocative goals, which are defined on the basis of 
geography.3
  1Farm legislation refers to the FRPP 
as the Farmland Protection Program.
  2Source of the 2002 Farm Act 
spending amounts is from the Office of 
Budget Policy and Analysis; 2008 Farm 
Act spending estimates are from the 
Congressional Budget Office.
  3Of the working-land and land pro-
tection programs discussed here, only 
EQIP contains legislated provisions that 
target funding by producer type.2
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Recent legislative actions have furthered allocative goals in conservation 
programs. In the 2002 and 2008 Farm Acts, the Regional Equity provi-
sions have required that each State receive a minimum amount of funding 
through, collectively, EQIP, WHIP, FRPP, and GRP.4 The 2002 Farm Act 
set the minimum funding threshold at $12 million, and the 2008 Farm Act 
increased it to $15 million. The provision did not include an allowance to 
increase annual program budgets to cover these additional payments to States 
that historically had received lower levels of funding. Those States that had 
been receiving a higher amount continue to receive it if overall program 
funds permit; to ensure, however, that all States receive at least the required 
minimum annual funding, USDA reallocates conservation funds, when 
necessary, among States in the affected programs. 
The Regional Equity provision affects multiple programs, so implementing it 
may involve a broader set of tradeoffs with other program goals than require-
ments that affect a single program. Each year since it was first passed in 
2002, the provision has resulted in reallocation of funds, in each of the four 
targeted programs, from States that exceeded the minimum threshold to those 
that did not. This provision allows additional lower priority applications to be 
enrolled in States that are allocated more funds and prevents lower priority 
applications from being enrolled in the other States. Funding reallocations 
across States can affect program outcomes in ways that are difficult to predict 
because a program’s applications that are viewed as low priority in one loca-
tion could be viewed as higher priority, or not a priority at all, in another 
location. Program outcomes could change because the characteristics of the 
applications—and the environmental problems the operators agree to treat—
differ across areas (that is, spatially) and across conservation programs. 
Agricultural operations across the United States are diverse, with both the 
types of production and characteristics of farms varying geographically. The 
severity of environmental problems arising from agricultural problems also 
varies geographically, as does the willingness of operators to implement 
conservation practices to address them (Lambert et al., 2006; Caswell et al., 
2001; Claassen et al., 2001). Local government priorities in each conserva-
tion program vary geographically as well. Collectively, these variations mean 
that operators in different locations will face different incentives to enroll in 
conservation programs. 
If programs initially were strictly designed to enroll producers who could 
provide the most environmental benefits for the least cost, we might expect 
the tradeoff from expanding participation in selected geographic areas or 
for particular producers to reduce the cost effectiveness of conservation 
programs. Cost effectiveness can decline when program changes result in 
fewer benefits for a given expenditure  or in the same level of benefits at a 
higher cost. However, policy changes to strengthen allocative goals may not 
necessarily occur at the expense of economic goals. Conservation programs 
are not designed to single-mindedly maximize environmental benefits, but 
instead attempt to satisfy multiple goals. As a result, reallocating program 
funds can have impacts that are hard to predict. Whether a policy change 
entails a tradeoff between the cost-effective delivery of environmental bene-
fits and other program goals depends on the relative values of benefits and 
costs provided by the contracts that ultimately are, and are not, funded as a 
result of the legislated change.
  4The term “State” used in this report 
includes the Pacific Basin territories 
and Puerto Rico.3 
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The literature provides little guidance on this question. Two recent ERS 
analyses found that efforts to further distributional goals may have increased 
conservation program costs. One study considered the impact of discon-
tinuing competitive bidding in EQIP—the option to bid down payments 
to improve chances of enrollment (Cattaneo et al., 2005). Bidding was 
discontinued in 2002 in EQIP because it was perceived as favoring large 
and well-established producers over small and limited-resource farmers. 
This mandated change affected program costs:  the average payment for 
implementing structural conservation practices was 35 percent of cost when 
bidding was allowed (1996-2002), but after bidding was discontinued, 
producers received the minimum Government cost-share of at least 50 
percent, and many producers received the maximum cost-share of 75 percent 
(Cattaneo et al., 2005).5 ERS analysis of post-2002 enrollment patterns 
revealed that they did not shift appreciably to States that—by some esti-
mates—may be likely to generate higher levels of environmental benefits 
(Hansen and Ribaudo, 2008), which suggests that discontinuation of bidding 
may have reduced EQIP’s ability to provide benefits in the most cost-effec-
tive manner (an economic goal). Another study found that because beginning 
and limited-resource farmers enrolled in EQIP receive favorable payment 
terms, they tend to receive larger payments per practice, even though they 
tend to treat fewer acres or install smaller structural practices. But they 
also operate more environmentally sensitive land than other participating 
farmers, have different conservation priorities, and receive different levels 
of payments (Nickerson and Hand, 2009). The differences among farmers 
who currently participate suggest that economic and environmental outcomes 
could change if more of these farmers were enrolled. 
The Regional Equity provision furthered allocative goals, described in the 
following section, that  already existed in the working-land programs. To deter-
mine how the provision’s stipulations for allocating funds affected program 
results, the authors examined data that help identify impacts on key program 
outcomes. This report describes the design structure of working-land conserva-
tion programs that allows them to accommodate allocative goals, and analyzes 
the impacts on conservation program outcomes of the Regional Equity provi-
sion that further these goals. The authors examine several key issues. First, 
we analyze the effects of the Regional Equity-induced funding reallocations 
on the number and types of contracts that were enrolled. We then evaluate the 
tradeoffs that occurred in terms of the resource problems that were ultimately 
treated. We use these findings to shed light on whether the Regional Equity 
provision reduced the ability of working-land programs as a group to achieve 
environmental and economic goals—by providing environmental benefits 
cost effectively—over the 2004-06 period. We also consider the impact of the 
Regional Equity provision on distributional goals by considering its effects 
on enrollments of livestock producers and beginning and limited-resource 
producers in EQIP—groups that are given favorable enrollment terms to 
encourage their participation. We use a methodological approach that identifies 
characteristics of contracts most susceptible to such changes, which is particu-
larly important in decentralized programs that allow for priority setting and 
enrollment decisions at a local level. Policymakers have a limited set of levers 
for affecting change in conservation programs, which increases the importance 
of understanding the potential tradeoffs from changes in programs that seek 
multiple goals simultaneously.
  5The 2002 Farm Act allowed States 
to contribute up to 90 percent of the 
cost of structural practices (e.g., fences, 
lagoons, and vegetative buffers) in-
curred by beginning or limited-resource 
producers.4
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Allocative Goals in Working-Land  
and Land Protection Programs
Along with environmental and economic goals of providing benefits cost 
effectively, regional funding allocation considerations have historically 
played an important role in the design of working-land and farm and grazing 
land protection programs. Since the inception of the programs, financial and 
technical assistance funds to address a variety of environmental problems 
have been made available to producers in all 50 States through EQIP, WHIP, 
FRPP and GRP (fig.1). 
In EQIP, WHIP, FRPP, and GRP, determining the funding each State NRCS 
office will receive involves two steps. First, in each program, most funds 
available for financial assistance are allocated using indicators reflecting 
national priorities in farm legislation.6,7 The specific types of indicators vary 
across programs (Appendix A). NRCS weights each indicator based on an 
assessment of the relative importance of the corresponding resource issue. 
Indicator weights are adjusted from time to time as new information or issues 
come to light. Second, funds for each indicator are then allocated to State 
NRCS offices based on the extent of the environmental concern that the indi-
cator represents in each State. For example, if land condition is a program 
indicator, States with higher percentages of poor quality land will receive 
a larger percentage of the funds allocated to the land condition indicator. 
  6Nearly a third of EQIP program 
funding is used for technical assistance 
to assist producers with conservation 
practice implementation. These funds 
have typically been allocated to States 
in proportion to the amount of financial 
assistance the States were awarded.
  7NRCS reserves a small portion 
of funds for special reasons, such as 
performance incentive awards.
Figure 1
Initial funding for EQIP,  WHIP,  GRP,  FRPP, 2006 (pre-Regional Equity reallocations)
EQIP - Environmental Quality Incentives Program; WHIP = Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program; GRP Grassland Reserve Program; 
FRPP = Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program.
*In 2006 only, NRCS administratively lowered the Regional Equity threshold from $12 to $11 million. 
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In each program, the total allocation of financial assistance funds for each 
State is the sum of the State allocations for each of the indicators. Allocating 
funds to States based on the relative extent and impairment of resources, 
rather than on absolute quantities, ensures that at least some funds from each 
program will be allocated to each State NRCS office (at least, for those indi-
cators that are present in the State). 
When allocative goals are sought, conservation funds in working-land and 
farm and grazing land protection programs tend to be less geographically 
concentrated among States than they would be otherwise. For example, in the 
Conservation Reserve Program, in which broad distribution of funds is not 
an explicit element of program design (applications are pooled nationally and 
prioritized on the basis of expected environmental benefits and costs), more 
than 56 percent of program outlays were concentrated in eight States in 2006. 
Each of these eight States individually accounted for more than 5 percent 
of outlays (fig. 2).8  In contrast, in EQIP, a decentralized program, only 
one State was allocated more than 5 percent of program funding in 2006. 
The eight States receiving the largest allocations in EQIP accounted for 33 
percent of total funding that year.
Even when conservation funding is allocated across States, program 
outcomes might not change substantially if all States had the same environ-
mental priorities and agreed to fund the same conservation practices at the 
same cost. But State-level priorities and decisions differ. These differences 
have an important bearing on which producers choose to apply for funding, 
as well as which are enrolled and receive conservation payments. The discre-
tion given to local NRCS offices in these programs introduces variations 
that make the impacts of national legislation on program outcomes harder to 
predict. 
  8The CRP does place a 25-percent 
cap on cropland enrolled in any one 
county, but there is no explicit enroll-
ment cap at the State level.
Figure 2
Comparative distribution of program funding to States, 2006
CRP = Conservation Reserve Program; EQIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program.
Sources: USDA-FSA CRP summary data; USDA-NRCS EQIP summary data.
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The Regional Equity Provision:   
Did Implementation Induce Environmental,  
Economic, or Distributional Tradeoffs?
An analysis of the Farm Act’s Regional Equity provision reveals how 
tradeoffs can arise from furthering allocative goals in conservation programs. 
Although minimum funding thresholds were set in the 2002 and 2008 Farm 
Acts at $12 million and $15 million, respectively, the Regional Equity provi-
sion did not dictate how the required minimum thresholds were to be met. 
During the 2004-06 period that we analyzed, USDA’s Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) determined how funds for the four programs 
would be reallocated to meet the requirement and the programs in which 
reallocations would occur.9 During this period, only in 2005 did realloca-
tions occur in all four affected programs (table 1). In 2004, NRCS reallo-
cated funds within EQIP, GRP, and FRPP to meet the requirement. In 2006, 
funding was not appropriated for GRP, so reallocations occurred only within 
EQIP, WHIP, and FRPP.
The reallocation that occurred within each program also varied each year. 
In EQIP, declining funds (in both total dollars and percentage of funding) 
were set aside specifically for States below the funding threshold over the 
2004-06 period, while in the other three programs an increasing percentage 
of funds was set aside. Most of the reallocations occurred through EQIP, but 
in 2006, WHIP and FRPP were particularly impacted by the Regional Equity 
provision: 22 and 38 percent of the Regional Equity reallocations occurred 
through these programs, even though the programs represented only 4 and 8 
percent of the combined program budgets, respectively.10
Over the 2004-06 period, the Regional Equity provision tended to shift 
program funds to 12 States—mostly the smaller States in the Northeast, but 
also to Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii (fig. 3). We define “Regional Equity 
States” (RE States) as the States that were initially below the minimum 
funding threshold and were then reallocated more conservation funds, and 
the “non-Regional Equity States” (non-RE States) as the remaining States. 
State Funding Levels Will Not Always Be Equally 
Affected by Changes in Overall Program Budgets
With its minimum allocations based on a fixed amount, the Regional Equity 
Provision has broad implications for which States gain or lose funding 
when overall conservation program budgets change. In the absence of the 
Regional Equity provision, declines or increases in overall program budgets 
would generally be shared equally by all States in proportion to their funding 
share. In the presence of the Regional Equity provision, however, overall 
program budget reductions will be absorbed by the majority of States whose 
allocated funding exceeds the minimum threshold amount, since States 
with funding levels at the fixed threshold are required to receive at least the 
threshold amount. As program budgets rise, States whose funding exceeds 
the threshold share in the increase, and fewer reallocations are necessary 
to assure that the other States are allocated the minimum required by the 
Regional Equity provision. If budgets become large enough that the Regional 
Equity provision no longer forces reallocation (all States’ budgets exceed the 
  9To implement the requirements of 
the Regional Equity provision, during 
2004-06, NRCS took several steps:  
NRCS estimated which States were 
likely to be below the threshold, and by 
how much; NRCS withheld an amount 
equal to this expected shortfall from 
program budgets and allocated the 
remainder to States using the programs’ 
allocation criteria; and NRCS then real-
located withheld funds to the under-
funded States according to need.  
  10The choice of which conserva-
tion programs are used to satisfy the 
Regional Equity requirement can affect 
the ultimate impact of the provision on 
program outcomes. ERS analysis (not 
reported here) revealed that it is pos-
sible to implement the Regional Equity 
provision by reallocating funds solely 
within EQIP because its budget is much 
larger than the other programs. Doing 
so would result in States’ receiving 
combined funding levels (from all four 
programs) that are not strikingly differ-
ent from the current method. However, 
because States would receive different 
amounts through each individual pro-
gram and because each program targets 
different environmental problems at 
different costs, such a strategy would 
likely result in different environmental 
benefit and cost tradeoffs.7 
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threshold), all States will share in the budget increase in proportion to their 
funding shares.
These unequal impacts of budget changes under the Regional Equity provi-
sion’s fixed set-asides contrast with the impacts of set-asides that advance 
distributional goals in EQIP. These other set-asides are specified as propor-
tional amounts, such as the 60 percent of the program budget set aside for 
livestock practices, 5 percent for beginning farmers and ranchers, and 5 
percent for socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. In these cases, 
the amounts ultimately  reserved for targeted groups vary in proportion to 
Table 1 
Funding levels and Regional Equity adjustments
Fiscal 
Year
EQIP WHIP GRP FRPP Total
2004 Total initial Financial Assistance (FA) 
funding1
$661,005,400  $27,800,000  $54,059,400  $84,833,000  $827,697,800 
Percent of total initial FA funding for  
all 4 programs
80% 3% 7% 10% 100%
Amount of FA funds reallocated to  
Regional Equity States 
$31,476,600  $0  $4,489,700  $8,640,000  $44,606,300 
Share of Regional Equity funds  
reallocated through program
71% 0% 10% 19% 100%
Percent of programs' initial FA funding 
affected by reallocations
5% 0% 8% 10%
Number of Regional Equity States2 14 0 14 10
Number of non-Regional Equity States2 38 0 38 42
2005 Total initial FA funding1  $691,525,000  $33,050,000  $65,960,000  $106,700,000  $897,235,000 
Percent of total initial funding for  
all 4 programs
77% 4% 7% 12% 100%
Amount of funds reallocated for Regional 
Equity - FA
$25,500,000  $6,240,000  $9,790,000  $12,000,000  $53,530,000 
Share of Regional Equity funds  
reallocated through program
48% 12% 18% 22% 100%
Percent of programs' initial FA funding 
affected by reallocations
4% 19% 15% 11%
Number of Regional Equity States2 14 13 13 12
Number of non-Regional Equity States2 38 39 37 40
2006 Total initial FA funding1 $697,100,000  $29,170,000  $0  $66,040,000  $792,310,000 
Percent of total initial funding for all 4 
programs
88% 4% 0% 8% 100%
Amount of funds reallocated for  
Regional Equity - FA
$18,700,000  $10,270,000  $0  $17,460,000  $46,430,000 
Share of Regional Equity funds  
reallocated through program
40% 22% 0% 38% 100%
Percent of programs' initial FA funding 
affected by reallocations
3% 35% 0% 26%
Number of Regional Equity States2  13 12 0 12
Number of non-Regional Equity States2 39 40 0 40
EQIP=Environmental Quality Incentives Program; WHIP=Wildlife Habitat Protection Program; GRP=Grassland Reserve Program; FRPP=Farm 
and Ranch Lands Protection Program.
1Analysis is limited to initial funding allocations for financial assistance.  Performance bonus funding is excluded.
2Regional Equity (non-Regional Equity) States are those that benefited (did not benefit) from the RE provision. 
The number of RE and non-RE States includes Pacific Basin and Carribean.  South Carolina became a non-RE State in EQIP in 2006.  Maine  
became a non-RE State in WHIP, in 2006.
Source:  NRCS data on Regional Equity allocations.8
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program budget changes, so all groups are relatively equally affected by 
overall funding changes.
Participation Patterns Differ Between RE  
and Non-RE States 
Conservation program participation patterns differ between Regional Equity 
and non-Regional Equity States, suggesting that Regional Equity-induced 
funding shifts can impact program outcomes in ways that are hard to predict. 
The programs subject to the Regional Equity provision depend on producers’ 
volunteering to participate—to implement conservation practices, restore 
grassland, or sell an easement—in exchange for program payments. The 
requirements imposed by the Farm Act’s Regional Equity provision result in 
some States’ receiving additional conservation money to meet the minimum 
funding threshold even when producer interest in participating and demand 
for program funding in those States is not strong. For example, in 2004 in 
EQIP, to meet the Regional Equity requirements, funds were shifted away 
from non-RE States that had, on average, three times more demand for 
program funds than RE States. In other programs, however, the Regional 
Figure 3
Regional Equity status
Note:  “Regional Equity State” means State received funds from other States due to the Regional Equity requirement. South Carolina did not 
receive additional Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) funds in any year; Maine did not receive WHIP funds in 2006. 
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS fund allocation data.  Map excludes Puerto Rico, an RE ‘State’ in 2004-2006.
Regional Equity status
Regional Equity State in 2004-2006
Regional Equity State in 2004,2005


























The Farm Act’s Regional Equity Provision: Impacts on Conservation Program Outcomes / ERR-98 
Economic Research Service/USDA
Equity provision resulted in more funding being allocated to States where 
producer interest in participating was higher. In FRPP, funds were shifted 
toward RE States with more than twice the average demand (demand is 
measured in terms of the dollars associated with unfulfilled contract appli-
cations). States with excess demand by producers experience the greatest 
competition for program funds, and they are the places where programs may 
have the greatest opportunity to achieve a given level of benefits at the least 
possible cost.11 
If little variation exists across States in the types of environmental prob-
lems treated and in the costs and benefits of the contracts funded within 
each program, satisfying an allocative objective by shifting program funds 
between RE and non-RE States will have little effect on program outcomes. 
However, several considerations suggest impacts of shifting funds are likely 
to be nontrivial. The four affected programs (EQIP, WHIP, FRPP, and GRP) 
are designed to address a variety of agriculturally related environmental 
issues, and the severity of these problems varies across the country. For 
example, water conservation has historically been a concern in the Western 
United States, where drought-related problems exist, and reducing fertilizer 
and nutrient runoff has been a concern throughout the country, especially 
in areas such as the Corn Belt and Chesapeake Bay watershed, where water 
quality problems impact local economies (see, for example, Bockstael et al., 
1989, Leggett and Bockstael, 2000, and Secchi et al., 2007). 
State NRCS offices have had considerable flexibility in working-land 
programs in determining which resource problems will receive priority in 
any given year, as well as flexibility with payment rates for practices that 
are cost-shared, and these priorities can vary even across neighboring States. 
Producers vary across States in their willingness to adopt particular practices 
and in terms of the costs they face even when adopting the same practice. 
The social benefits of conservation treatment can also vary across States; 
some types of benefits are highest when actions are concentrated in high-
population States (Hansen and Ribaudo, 2008; Feather et al., 1999). Taken 
together, the variation in environmental problems, State-level priorities, 
producer preferences, and costs and benefits suggests that shifting funds from 
one State to another could result in very different conservation outcomes.
Summary statistics for two programs, EQIP and WHIP, suggest that by 
several measures—including costs, types of practices, and resource prob-
lems receiving treatment—a shift in program funds between RE States and 
non-RE States would result in different types of contracts being funded. In 
terms of costs, the Regional Equity provision has shifted funds to States 
with higher contract payments on average, although in both groups of States 
wide variation exists.12 These average contract payments ranged from about 
$24,000 to $29,000 per contract in RE States over 2004-06, while in non-RE 
States they ranged from about $15,000 to $18,000 (table 2). In WHIP, RE 
States funded contracts that were twice as large, on average, due primarily to 
large contract payments in Alaska and Hawaii. 
One reason contract payments were higher in RE States was that those States 
tended to reimburse participants for cost-shared practices at a higher rate than 
non-RE States. EQIP and WHIP provide cost-share assistance to producers 
who install structural practices (e.g., manure storage, irrigation systems, 
  11Even in programs like EQIP that 
seek to maximize benefits, many States 
consider cost in enrollment decisions—
so competition for limited funding 
could induce producers to choose to 
implement less costly conservation 
practices.
  12The coefficient of variation (CV) 
is above 1.45 for both RE and non-RE 
States in each year. The CV is a mea-
sure of the variation in a population, 
and values exceeding one are typically 
considered high-variance.10
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fencing, and field-edge vegetative buffers) and financial assistance to those 
adopting conservation-compatible management practices like nutrient 
management and prescribed grazing. In EQIP, the largest proportion of 
contracts in RE States received cost-share payments for structural practices 
at a 75-percent rate, while in non-RE States most contracts were cost-shared 
at a 50-percent rate. In WHIP, three-quarters of the contracts in RE States 
received a 75-percent cost-share rate compared with half of contracts in 
non-RE States that received that rate.
The higher average cost of contracts in RE States suggests that fewer 
contracts may have been funded across all States in EQIP and WHIP because 
of the Regional Equity provision. However, higher costs do not neces-
sarily mean that program benefits were reduced. RE States tended to fund 
contracts with producers who agreed to address more resource concerns 
and adopt more practices. Further, in EQIP, the RE States tended to fund 
more contracts that implemented combinations of practices—that is, more 
producers in RE States agreed to implement both structural and manage-
ment practices to address environmental concerns. Implementing a group of 
Table 2













Average payments - all  
contracts 2004 $23,400   $15,000    -    -
2005  $22,500   $15,300   $16,700   $8,500 
2006  $28,800   $17,800   $23,600   $8,900 
Cost-share rates1  Percent of Contracts1
   50% cost-share rate 2005 28% 52% 3% 18%
   51 - 74% cost-share rate 2005 19% 30% 22% 28%
   75% cost-share rate 2005 39% 13% 75% 54%
   > 75% cost-share rate 2005 14% 5% 0% 0%
Practice type
   Structural only 2006 41% 51% 33% 46%
   Management only 2006 31% 26% 48% 34%
   Structural and management 2006 28% 24% 18% 19%
Spending by resource concern  Percent of contract costs
   Soil condition 2006 8% 8% 0% 0%
   Soil erosion 2006 14% 17% 18% 9%
   Domestic animals 2006 8% 11% 0% 1%
   Plant condition 2006 17% 16% 6% 3%
   Water quantity 2006 11% 13% 2% 2%
   Water quality 2006 37% 29% 3% 2%
   Air quality 2006 3% 3% 0% 0%
   Fish and wildlife 2006 3% 3% 72% 84%
EQIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program; WHIP = Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program. 
1Some contracts contain multiple practices cost-shared at different rates, and for these 
contracts the (weighted) average cost-share rate falls between the standard 50%, 
75%, or 90% rates.
Source:  ERS analysis of NRCS contract data.  11 
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practices, as in a conservation system, can be more effective at addressing 
environmental problems than single practices (e.g., Lerch et al., 2005; Berry 
et al., 2003).
The resources receiving priority, as measured by costs incurred for treating 
problems, differ somewhat between the RE and non-RE States. In 2006 
in EQIP, the largest share of contract funds in both groups of States was 
devoted to treating surface water quality problems, with RE States spending 
37 percent of funds on these issues compared with 29 percent in non-RE 
States (spending patterns in previous years were similar). In addressing other 
issues, the share of funds spent by both groups of States was more similar 
(table 2). Due to WHIP’s narrower focus on species and habitat protec-
tion, it is not surprising that, in both groups of States, most WHIP funds are 
spent on fish and wildlife issues—72 percent and 84 percent of costs in RE 
and non-RE States, respectively—although different species may benefit in 
different States (table 2). Also, a greater share of contract costs in the RE 
States was incurred to treat soil erosion—18 percent compared with 9 percent 
in non-RE States. 
The Regional Equity Provision Entailed Economic  
and Environmental Tradeoffs 
The differences between conservation program contracts and the general types 
of practices adopted in the RE versus non-RE States are indicative of some of 
the likely impacts of the Regional Equity provision. However, it is the specific 
characteristics of the additionally enrolled contracts in RE States, and of the 
applications that did not receive funding in non-RE States, that ultimately 
determine the economic and environmental tradeoffs resulting from enactment 
of the Regional Equity provision. These characteristics also determine whether 
tradeoffs occurred between allocative and distributional objectives, such as 
whether certain producer types gained or lost conservation funding. 
Data on specific contracts funded through EQIP and WHIP, coupled with 
an understanding of the fund allocation formulas used by the conservation 
programs, demonstrate some of the environmental, economic, and distribu-
tional impacts of the Regional Equity provision over the 2004-06 period in 
those programs. Our analysis recognizes that the lowest ranked contracts 
(“marginal contracts”) are the most vulnerable to the funding shifts resulting 
from Regional Equity reallocations. We estimated which marginal contracts 
were affected by the Regional Equity-induced changes in State budgets, and 
the characteristics of these marginal contracts formed the basis for our esti-
mates of environmental and economic tradeoffs of the Regional Equity provi-
sion (see box, “Methods”).
Using a methodology that relies on information from the marginal contracts 
to estimate the effects of provisions furthering an allocative goal has a 
number of advantages. By definition, the marginal contracts are those least 
preferred for enrollment, which means they are less likely to address the 
resource concerns of highest priority to the jurisdiction, or they do so at 
higher cost. An analysis of contract data reveals that the marginal contracts 
in States that benefited from the Regional Equity reallocations have different 
characteristics than nonmarginal contracts. Using more aggregated data, such 12
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Methods
To estimate the effects of the Regional Equity provision, we used the 
programs’ Federal funding allocation formulas to approximate how States’ 
funding for financial assistance changed due to the Regional Equity provi-
sion.  In  the  RE  States,  the  Regional  Equity  provision  expanded  State 
funding to bring them to the $12 million threshold, so the contracts affected 
by the provision were those funded with the additional money. In these 
States we identified the “marginal” contracts using the ranking score of 
each application, and assumed those applications ranked lowest were the 
additional contracts. In the non-RE States, the RE provision reduced State 
budgets,  resulting  in  some  applications’  remaining  unfunded.  Because 
the Regional Equity provision was enacted during a period of increasing 
program budgets and high producer demand for conservation funding, we 
assumed that the changes in State-level budgets induced by the provision 
did not affect producers’ incentives or decisions to apply to the conserva-
tion programs. 
Ideally, data on proposed practices and the acres and resource issues to 
be treated would be available from a review of all conservation program 
applications, and these data could be used to characterize how outcomes 
would have changed if additional applications had been funded in the 
non-RE States. However, such data are available only on contracts that 
received funding. In the absence of applicant data, several alternatives 
exist for proxying the practices and actions applicants would be willing to 
undertake if additional funds were available to increase enrollments. One 
alternative is to assume that previously unfunded applicants’ parcels have 
similar characteristics to the entire farmland population. Using simulations 
coupled with program cost data, we could estimate, on average, how many 
acres applicants would be willing to treat, for which resource concerns, 
and at what cost. However, this strategy may not be ideal in programs 
like EQIP and WHIP, which, our analyses show, enroll a non-homogenous 
set of contracts in any given year (see Appendix B). We used a different 
strategy, one that assumes an expanded budget would enroll land that most 
closely  resembles  a  much  narrower  segment  of  farmland:  the  applica-
tions that got funded but were of the lowest priority for enrollment—those 
contracts that were ranked just slightly higher than rejected applications. 
Assuming similarity between these two groups implies that producers with 
low-priority contracts that were accepted and those that just missed being 
accepted have similar expectations about the profitability of implementing 
particular practices to mitigate particular physical effects.*  By comparing 
the characteristics of marginal contracts in the RE States to those in the 
non-RE States, we were able to discern how acres receiving treatment, the 
types of physical effects receiving treatment, practice types and costs, and 
participant types were affected by the Regional Equity provision. 
* This approach also assumes that a sufficient amount of acreage remains that 
needs treatment for the resource concerns that were addressed by the marginally 
accepted contracts. EQIP and WHIP have historically had a large backlog of appli-
cations, so it is plausible that an adequate supply of land needing treatment exists.13 
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as the characteristics of the “average” contract—which is tempting because 
it would involve simpler calculations—can be misleading for policy analysis 
(see Appendix B). Our method also takes into account the variation in local 
priorities afforded by the decentralized structure of working-land programs. 
Other methodological approaches are less able to accommodate this varia-
tion, which is likely to have important impacts on local enrollment incentives 
and program outcomes. 
Our analysis involved three steps to identify environmental and economic 
impacts of the Regional Equity provision:
•	First,	to	estimate	environmental	impacts,	we	used	the	data	on	marginal	
contracts affected by the Regional Equity provision to estimate the 
change in the number of acres that received treatment for various envi-
ronmental problems as a result of the funding shifts across States. 
•	Second,	to	estimate	economic	impacts,	we	analyzed	the	costs	of	treating	
environmental problems associated with the contracts affected by the 
Regional Equity provision (see Appendix C). Because the goal of the 
economic analysis was to compare changes in treatment costs to changes 
in benefits from the treatment effort, the cost analysis was limited to the 
subset of conservation treatment activities for which benefit estimates 
were available. These were activities undertaken to reduce erosion from 
wind and water (to improve onsite soil productivity and water and air 
quality and reduce sedimentation); to improve grazing productivity, 
water conservation, wildlife habitat, and pheasant-hunting opportuni-
ties; and to create wetlands. EQIP and WHIP contracts address more 
issues than this limited set of activities, but a lack of information on the 
benefits of treating other issues meant a substantial portion of conserva-
tion activity was excluded from our analysis. In EQIP, 24-50 percent of 
contract costs mapped to these nine benefit categeories over the study 
period; in WHIP, 56-75 percent did so (see box, “Conservation Activities 
Linked to Environmental Benefits”). 
•	Finally,	for	each	category	of	conservation	treatment	we	considered,	we	
combined per acre cost and benefit data with estimates of the number of 
acres treated in the watershed in 2004-06 to find out whether the changes 
in conservation treatment resulting from the Regional Equity provision 
resulted in additional net benefits or costs (see Appendix D for a descrip-
tion of the studies from which the earlier benefit estimates were derived). 
The Regional Equity Provision Affected the  
Number of Acres Treated
Estimates of the acres receiving treatment reveal that the impacts of the 
Regional Equity provision differed over the study period (see Appendix C 
for methods used to estimate acres subject to treatment). In 2004 and 2005, 
the shifts in funding from the non-RE States to the RE States resulted in net 
losses in the acres receiving conservation treatment for a number of envi-
ronmental problems in EQIP and, in 2005 and 2006, also for WHIP. For 
example, in EQIP in 2004, over 70,000 fewer acres received treatment for 
grazing productivity, sedimentation, and water quality problems and over 
200,000 fewer acres were enrolled for water quantity issues (fig. 4).13 In 
  13In some cases, the same acres 
received treatment for more than one 
resource concern, so adding up the net 
gains and losses in acres across catego-
ries would likely overstate the net effect 
of the Regional Equity reallocations on 
the total number of acres treated.14
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Conservation Activities Linked to Environmental Benefits
Conservation programs provide a wide range of environmental and social benefits. While important, many of these 
benefits are difficult to quantify in monetary terms that enable a comparison to program costs. Due to limited data 
on the benefits of conservation treatment, a relatively small proportion of contract costs for EQIP were included 
in the economic analysis of Regional Equity impacts. In 2004 and 2005, only 24 percent of the costs of marginal 
contracts—those contracts affected by the Regional Equity provision—were incurred to treat problems for which 
benefit estimates were available (see the EQIP contract costs figure below). In 2006, 50 percent of contract costs 
were related to the nine benefit categories. In WHIP in 2005, 56 percent of marginal contract costs were related to 
the seven benefit categories addressed by that program, compared with 75 percent in 2006 (see the figure). There 
could be a number of reasons for the difference in the amount of conservation activity associated with measurable 
benefits in 2006. Local government priorities can change yearly, as can the financial incentives producers have to 
address particular resource problems. We found reasonable consistency across years between conservation prac-
tices and the resource problems that local field offices indicated were associated with particular resource concerns 
(see Appendix C). In all years, the analyses were limited to program activity in the contiguous 48 States. Because 
benefit estimates are not available for any resource issues in Alaska and Hawaii or the territories, all costs associ-
ated with contracts funded in these places were excluded from our analysis. 
EQIP contract costs by benefit category—contracts affected by RE provision
**Includes all costs of contracts affected by RE provision in Alaska, Hawaii, Pacific Basin Territories, and Puerto Rico.
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS contract data.
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2005, except for reductions in the amount of land receiving treatment for 
grazing productivity issues, the net changes in acres receiving treatment were 
not as dramatic in EQIP (fig. 5). In 2006, however, the Regional Equity real-
locations resulted in significant net gains in treated acres for plant and soil 
condition issues in EQIP (fig. 6). 
In WHIP, program funding levels were significantly lower than in EQIP, and 
fewer resource concerns were treated. The biggest impacts were net losses 
of 20,000 to 55,000 acres treated each year for pheasant-hunting and wildlife 
habitat (figs. 7 and 8).
Costs and Benefits Vary Between Contracts Funded in 
RE States Versus Contract Applications in non-RE States
An analysis of per acre treatment costs for the selected resource concerns 
revealed that contracts funded with Regional Equity funds in RE States had 
higher per acre costs than the contracts that would have been funded, in the 
absence of Regional Equity restrictions, in non-RE States (table 3).14 This 
finding held throughout the 3-year study period, in both EQIP and WHIP, 
almost without exception.15 Costs varied over a wide range, however. In 
some cases, the maximum cost per acre estimate exceeded the mean per acre 
estimate by several thousand dollars in the RE States, due to the installation 
of some expensive practices (e.g., micro-irrigation systems, waste storage 
facilities, and ponds), along with implementation of a broad combination of 
structural, vegetative, and management practices. In some cases, Regional 
Equity funds were used to install less typical practices at a high cost per acre, 
such as shellfish aquaculture management systems. 
  14Another important consideration 
was technical assistance costs (TA). 
The contract data contain information 
on the financial assistance (FA) costs 
of implementing practices, but do not 
identify which practices or resource 
issues required TA. TA costs are not 
insignificant outlays—in EQIP between 
2004 and 2006, TA costs represented 
about 21 percent, 24 percent, and 28 
percent of the total program budgets, 
respectively. In WHIP, TA costs were 
22 percent and 28 percent in 2005 and 
2006, respectively. We assumed that TA 
was necessary for meeting nondegrada-
tion standards, so in developing the  per 
acre cost estimates we increased the 
costs to reflect TA based on these over-
all portions of the budget (e.g., in EQIP 
in 2006, TA represented an overall 40 
percent of FA costs, so 40 percent was 
added to the cost of contracts in that 
year).
  15The one exception was that, in 
WHIP, the marginal contracts in RE 
States provided sheet and rill erosion 
reduction benefits at a lower cost per 
acre.
Figure 4
EQIP 2004: estimated net gain/loss in acres treated due to Regional Equity provision

































Acres associated with measurable benefits Benefit measures are not 
available for acres receiving 
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Figure 6
EQIP 2006: estimated net gain/loss in acres treated due to Regional Equity provision
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS administrative data.
Acres associated with 
measurable benefits











































































































































































































































































































































































Benefit measures are not available for acres 
receiving treatment in these categories
Figure 5
EQIP 2005: estimated net gain/loss in acres treated due to Regional Equity provision
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS administrative data.
Acres associated with 
measurable benefits


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Benefit measures are not available for acres 
receiving treatment in these categories17 
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Figure 8
WHIP 2006: estimated net gain/loss in acres treated due to Regional Equity provision
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS administrative data.
Acres associated with 
measurable benefits
WHIP = Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program.
Benefit measures are not available for acres 











































































































































































































































































































































































WHIP 2005: estimated net gain/loss in acres treated due to Regional Equity provision
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS administrative data.
Acres associated with 
measurable benefits
WHIP = Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program.
Benefit measures are not available for acres 
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The benefits from conservation treatment also appeared to vary between RE 
and non-RE States, at least for the subset of conservation activities for which 
benefit estimates were available. Regionally varying estimates of benefits that 
were drawn from a number of studies reveal that the average per acre benefits 
from reducing sedimentation and increasing water quality were higher in 
RE than non-RE States (table 4). (See Appendix D for a description of the 
studies from which the benefit estimates were derived.) This suggests that 
shifting conservation efforts to RE States to mitigate these problems could 
produce greater conservation benefits. The benefits from creating wetlands 
are an order of magnitude higher than the other benefits, because wetlands 
generate a whole set of benefits, including improved water quality, wildlife 
habitat, and recreational opportunities. Though wetland-related benefits are 
likely to vary by area, regional estimates were not available.
Despite reducing the number of acres that received treatment for many 
resource problems, the RE provision increased the net benefits from treating 
some of them (net benefits are calculated as gross benefits minus costs). The 
RE provision allowed EQIP to generate an estimated additional $4.5 million 
and $2.4 million in sedimentation reduction benefits in 2005 and 2006, and 
an estimated additional $490,000 in soil productivity benefits in 2004 and 
2005 (fig. 9). These changes occurred because the acres that were treated 
in RE States (in those treatment areas for which we have benefit measures) 
generated higher levels of benefits than the acres that would have received 
treatment in the non-RE States, due partly to higher surrounding popula-
tion levels that benefit from improved environmental conditions. In terms of 
grazing productivity benefits, the RE provision generated net losses of about 
$2 million yearly. The effects also varied by year. For the nine categories of 
environmental issues considered, the RE provision collectively resulted in 
losses of net benefits in EQIP of about $2.5 million in 2004, a gain of $2.3 
million in net benefits in 2005, and losses of $3 million in 2006. 
Table 3



























Average contract cost per acre2
RE States $207.26  $180.81  $359.52  $785.25  $311.97  $574.84  $511.91  $451.95  -
Non-RE States 58.94 27.77 54.88 142.03 73.97 100.26 39.8 50.09 -
Standard deviation
RE States 339.6 148.68 582.64 1,224.42 450.7 1,024.29 843.29 711.8 -
Non-RE States 174.27 46.13 90.11 235.21 143.27 225.64 54.77 121.33 -
Minimum contract cost per acre3
RE States 0.07 0.07 1.46 0.37 1.73 1.54 1.36 4.67 -
Non-RE States 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.14 0.1 0.3 0.51 0.51 -
Maximum contract cost per acre
RE States 1,513.08 507.88 2,154.63 5,354.42 1,759.24 4,968.55 3,407.07 1,958.09 -
Non-RE States 1,217.43 192.82 490.73 760.05 639.93 1,348.83 186.92 646.56 -
EQIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program. 
1Table includes costs associated with mitigating those physical effects for which monetary estimates of benefits exist.
2The costs per acre used to create these descriptive statistics were the contract cost per acre at the watershed level.
3Many contracts treated multiple resource concerns, and in those cases contract costs were divided among the resource concerns. 
This contributes to the small minimum cost per acre estimates.
Source:  ERS analysis of NRCS contract data.  19 
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In WHIP, for the nine environmental categories considered, the Regional 
Equity provision generated losses of net benefits of about $1.8 million in 
2005 and $4.9 million in 2006 (WHIP was not affected by the Regional 
Equity provision in 2004) (fig. 10). The contracts enrolled in several States 
addressed different resource concerns between the 2 years, which contrib-
uted to this large difference. The measurable losses in net benefits in WHIP 
were also larger than those in EQIP in 2006, even though WHIP is a smaller 
Figure 9
Effects of the Regional Equity provision on selected net benefits in EQIP1
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS administrative data.
1Includes only the conservation activity funded through Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in the continental U.S. for which 
estimates of the benefits of treatment are available in dollar terms.






























































































































































Average benefits from conservation measures (in 2004 dollars)
Benefits from reduced erosion  






















RE States $3.43  $1.82  $32.27  $16.83  $9.03  $2.61  $19.60  $0.06  $550.00 
Non-RE States:
Appalachia 3.83   -       24.14   14.43   12.00  -       23.47   0.16   50.00 
Corn Belt  5.49   -       11.89   11.90   10.49   0.75  25.38   4.04   550.00 
Delta 1.53   -       12.64   5.46   13.22   5.54   22.81   0.20   550.00 
Mountain  0.09   3.87   $0.98   0.23   3.33   14.31   0.73   0.19   550.00 
NE & Lake States  3.54   0.04  18.99   15.62   9.44   -       25.69   2.66   550.00 
Northern Plains  0.74   1.68   2.64   1.87   5.24   2.98   3.55   1.92   550.00 
Pacific  0.51   2.02   5.08   4.67   5.57   19.19   0.32   -       550.00 
Southeast  1.79   -       19.78   7.54   12.64   2.86   23.31   -       550.00 
Southern Plains  0.51   1.95   5.87   3.41  6.36   4.68   15.12   0.08   550.00 
RE = Regional Equity Provision. 
Note: Benefit measures are not available for Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Pacific Basin Countries, and the Caribbean.
Source:  Source: See Appendix D.20
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program in terms of overall program funding. These cross-program effects 
might have been different, however, if data constraints had not prevented 
analysis of the impacts on net benefits for the full set of conservation activity 
in both programs. Benefit measures were available for more conservation 
activity in WHIP than in EQIP, so more EQIP activity was excluded from 
our analyses (see box, “Conservation Activities Linked to Environmental 
Benefits” and fig. 6). 
These analyses reveal that the Regional Equity provision resulted in a 
number of tradeoffs that were likely to affect the ability of the programs to 
provide environmental benefits cost effectively. They also reveal that the 
direction and magnitude of environmental and economic impacts of the 
Regional Equity provision are resource specific. For grazing productivity and 
water conservation issues in EQIP and wildlife and pheasant-hunting habitat 
in WHIP, the funding shifts across States reduced both the amount of land 
receiving treatment and the net benefits from treatment, at least during the 
3-year period we studied. For most other resource issues, there were reduc-
tions in the amount of land receiving treatment, but the economic impacts 
were negligible or positive. The differing impacts across programs also 
suggest that the way an allocative policy is implemented may be an important 
determinant of the collective environmental and economic impacts. 
Figure 10
Effects of the Regional Equity provision on selected net benefits in WHIP1
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS administrative data.
1Includes only the conservation activity funded through Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) in the continental U.S. for which 
estimates of the benefits of treatment are available in dollar terms.
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The Regional Equity Provision Is Compatible With 
Distributional Goals of Working-Land Programs
The Regional Equity provision does not appear to work at cross-purposes 
with distributional goals in working-land programs. In addition to envi-
ronmental, economic, and allocative goals, EQIP is designed to provide 
favorable treatment for certain types of operations and producers. Because 
targeted producers who participate in EQIP are not distributed equally among 
States and States do not always prioritize them for enrollment, the minimum 
funding allocations of the Regional Equity provision could have unintended 
impacts on participation by targeted producers. For example, by law, at 
least 60 percent of overall EQIP funding must be used for livestock-related 
conservation practices (USDA treats all practices implemented by livestock 
producers as livestock related (USDA, 2003)). Our analyses of payments by 
producer type suggest the 60-percent threshold would have been satisfied 
with or without the Regional Equity provision: Livestock operators received 
between 66 and 71 percent of EQIP funding annually after the Regional 
Equity funding reallocations occurred. Satisfying the Regional Equity provi-
sion reduced the number of livestock contracts, but only by an estimated 1.5 
percent, or 500-700 contracts annually over the 2004-06 period. 
Beginning farmers and farmers with limited financial resources also receive 
special attention in EQIP. The 2002 Farm Act authorized these producers 
to receive higher cost-share reimbursement rates (up to 90 percent of prac-
tice installation cost compared with a 75-percent maximum rate for other 
producers). The 2008 Farm Act authorized additional favorable payment 
terms, expanded eligibility for favorable terms to socially disadvantaged 
farmers, and required that beginning farmers and socially disadvantaged 
producers have access to at least 5 percent of program funds. Over the 
2004-06 period, a larger proportion of contracts in the RE States were held 
by beginning and limited-resource producers, and while the Regional Equity 
reallocations allowed more of them to be enrolled, the impacts were small—
an average of 100 additional contracts were written with these producers 
annually over the 2004-06 period. The funding shifts also had no appreciable 
impact on the overall EQIP funding received by beginning farmers, which 
averaged 11-12 percent of financial assistance annually over the 2004-06 
period. 22
The Farm Act’s Regional Equity Provision: Impacts on Conservation Program Outcomes / ERR-98
Economic Research Service/USDA
Conclusions
Allocative goals established by congressional legislation play an impor-
tant role in the design of U.S. conservation programs for working lands. 
In conservation programs such as EQIP, WHIP, FRPP, and GRP, program 
funds are allocated to State program offices, where decisions are made about 
which resource problems will receive priority and which applications are 
accepted—either at the State or sub-State level. In EQIP, State offices can 
delegate these decisions, as well as the authority to choose payment rates 
and the conservation practices that will be funded, to local (sub-State) NRCS 
offices. This decentralized structure results in broad distribution of conserva-
tion funds, with producers in neighboring jurisdictions potentially having 
different incentives for enrollment. 
How these legislative provisions are structured can have broad implications 
for which groups or regions are affected by program changes. In particular, 
policies that require fixed set-asides for particular regions result in dispro-
portional impacts of program budget changes. For example, the Regional 
Equity provision guarantees that each State NRCS office is allocated funding 
equal to or greater than the fixed threshold ($12 million annually through 
EQIP, WHIP, FRPP, and GRP combined in the 2002 Farm Act, raised to 
$15 million in the 2008 Farm Act). If overall program funding were to 
fall, and there were no Regional Equity provision, each State NRCS office 
would experience a reduction in conservation program funding in propor-
tion to the share of the budget that State normally receives. With a binding 
Regional Equity provision, however, a decline in overall program funding 
would be absorbed by the subset of States without protected funding. As 
program budgets rise, the impact of the Regional Equity provision on the 
States without protected funding is reduced. Alternatively, when set-asides 
are specified as a proportion of overall funding—such as the mandated 
60-percent set-aside for livestock practices or the 5-percent set-aside for 
beginning farmers—the funding reserved for targeted groups is scaled up and 
down proportionally as budgets change.
When legislation applies to programs that already seek to achieve envi-
ronmental, economic, distributional, and allocative goals, it is difficult to 
predict the direction and magnitude of potential tradeoffs when new legisla-
tion furthering an allocative goal is layered on top. Our analysis suggests 
the Regional Equity provision of the 2002 Farm Act resulted in a number of 
tradeoffs with other program goals. Meeting the requirement meant that each 
program agency had to shift funds among States. This changed the number 
and mix of producers who were accepted into the program in different States. 
While the provision did increase conservation funding for the dozen or so 
States that historically had received limited amounts through Federal conser-
vation programs, it resulted in declines in the number of acres receiving 
EQIP funding to treat most environmental problems. The funding shifts also 
resulted in increased treatment costs per acre for many environmental proj-
ects funded by EQIP and WHIP. However, the shifts also resulted in more 
conservation activity being given to States where the benefits per acre from 
treatment were higher because more people benefited from the conserva-
tion activity undertaken by producers. In some cases, the increase in the per 
acre benefits was greater than the increase in treatment costs. For example, 23 
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the Regional Equity provision decreased the net benefits (calculated as 
gross benefits minus costs) from improving grazing productivity by about 
$2 million annually over the 2004-06 period in EQIP, but increased the net 
benefits from reducing sedimentation problems by $4 million in 2005 and 
over $2 million in 2006.16 While the Regional Equity provision’s overall 
impact on benefits provided by the affected conservation programs could not 
be estimated because of data limitations, the patterns we found clearly show 
that the provision affects program benefits.
When program agencies have flexibility for implementing legislation, an 
understanding of the economic, environmental, allocative, and distribu-
tional impacts of alternative implementation options can guide the decision-
makers’ choice of a strategy that minimizes the losses of benefits from all 
affected programs. The Regional Equity provision reduced net benefits from 
addressing environmental problems in WHIP in the 2 years of our study 
when WHIP was subject to the provision’s requirements, but the impacts in 
EQIP were more mixed. Impacts may not be correlated with program size; 
even though WHIP is smaller than EQIP in terms of overall funding, in 2006 
the net losses to WHIP that we could measure with existing data were one-
and-a-half times larger. 
Policymakers face important decisions about how to use conservation 
program funds to deliver environmental benefits in a cost-effective manner. 
In conservation programs that are also designed to achieve distributional 
goals, it is not immediately apparent what impact a policy change to further 
allocative goals will have on a program’s cost effectiveness or the amount 
of land receiving treatment. As analysis of the effects of the Regional Equity 
provision demonstrates, even when the amount of land receiving treatment 
decreases, net environmental benefits could increase if conservation activity 
shifts to places that provide more benefits. Because the environmental and 
economic characteristics of farms participating in conservation programs 
vary widely, understanding the characteristics of the contracts affected by a 
policy change—the conservation choices, treatment costs, and value of bene-
fits provided by treatment—is necessary to determine the impacts of policy 
changes on all program goals in working-land programs. 
  16Conservation programs fund 
activities that can increase the ame-
nity, scenic, and recreational value of 
agricultural land in ways that are not 
easily expressed in dollar terms. These 
values can be higher when more people 
have access to the amenities (Feather et 
al., 1999), which suggests that shifting 
program activity to higher population 
States can increase these nonmarket 
benefits. 24
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Appendix A. Allocative Goals in Working-Land and 
Land Protection Programs
In U.S. working-land and land protection programs, each program uses a 
unique set of design options that allow allocative as well as environmental, 
economic, and distributional goals to be met.
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
EQIP is USDA’s major conservation program for working lands. It provides 
funding for conservation activities that address a wide range of resource 
issues, including soil quality, water quality, air quality, greenhouse gases, 
water and energy conservation, and wildlife habitat. All agricultural 
producers engaged in crop and livestock production are eligible to apply, as 
long as they comply with highly erodible land (Conservation Compliance) 
and wetland (Swampbuster) conservation requirements and do not exceed 
specified income levels.
EQIP has a long history of operating as a decentralized program with alloca-
tive goals. EQIP was enacted in 1996 and combined the conservation func-
tions of four preexisting programs. One of its predecessors, the Agricultural 
Conservation Program (ACP), allocated program funds to State NRCS 
offices almost from its inception in 1936, with the goal of targeting funds to 
specific practices in all counties (Mercker, 1936). In 1996, the newly formed 
EQIP continued to allocate funds to State NRCS offices, based on conserva-
tion priorities. However, emphasis shifted to enrolling producers in locally 
determined “priority areas” facing the greatest environmental problems, 
rather than distributing enrollments across counties. In 2002, the practice 
of targeting enrollments to priority areas was eliminated, due primarily to 
producer dissatisfaction with the limited opportunities for enrollment outside 
priority areas (USDA, 2003). 
In recent years, 31 indicators have been included in the mechanism used to 
allocate financial assistance across State NRCS offices. These indicators are 
of two types: (1) indicators measuring resource availability in the State (e.g., 
acres of grazing land and wetland) and (2) indicators measuring the extent 
of resource impairments (e.g., acres of highly erodible cropland, and the 
potential for pesticide runoff) (table A.1) (U.S. GAO, 2006). NRCS weights 
each indicator based on an assessment of the relative importance of the 
corresponding resource issue. In 2006, the 31 resource indicators were each 
allocated between 0.5 and 6.2 percent of financial assistance funds. Funds for 
each indicator were then allocated to each State NRCS office based on the 
extent and impairment of the indicator in the State.
Since 2002, EQIP has given States wide flexibility in awarding contracts 
within their allocated funds, allowing States to target enrollments to meet 
their individual needs. Some States pool all applicants and make enrollment 
decisions at a State level, while others allocate all funds to sub-State NRCS 
offices that make the enrollment decisions. Some States adopt a mixture 
of these two approaches, retaining a portion of funds at the State level for 
specific resource concerns and allocating remaining funds to local NRCS 
offices. Each jurisdiction can have unique point systems for ranking and 28
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enrolling contracts, unique sets of conservation practices that are eligible for 
funding, and different payment rates (although since 2002, payment rates for 
conservation practice installation have been constrained by law to between 
50 and 75 percent of practice cost, but up to 90 percent for beginning and 
limited-resource farmers). This means that producers in neighboring jurisdic-
tions (even within the same State) can face different incentives for enrolling 
in EQIP. Since 2007, locally developed point systems have been required to 
assign a positive weight to national resource priorities (though the weights 
assigned to national issues need not be the same as those used to allocate 
funds to States). In addition to the relative weights of resource problems, 
many State and sub-State NRCS offices also consider contract cost in their 
rankings. 
Table A.1
Indicators and weights used to allocate EQIP funds to States, 2006
Indicators for resource issues Weight
Acres of nonirrigated cropland 3.2
Acres of irrigated cropland 4.3
Acres of Federal grazing land 0.5
Acres of non-Federal grazing land 4.3
Acres of forestlands 1.1
Acres of specialty cropland 3.2
Acres of wetlands and at-risk species habitat 4.6
Acres of bodies of water 3.2
Livestock animal units 5.8
Animal waste generation 5.8
Waste management capital cost 3.5
Acres of American Indian tribal lands 3.3
Number of limited resource producers 5
Acres of grazing land lost to conversion 0.8
Air quality nonattainment areas 1.4
Acres of pastureland needing treatment 5.5
Acres of cropland eroding above T 6.2
Acres of fair and poor rangeland 6.2
Acres of forestlands eroding above T 1.4
Acres of cropland and pastureland soils affected  
by saline and/or sodic conditions
2.6
Miles of impaired rivers and streams 3.6
Potential for pesticide and nitrogen leaching 1.3
Potential for pesticide and nitrogen runoff 1.7
Ratio of livestock animal units to cropland 1.7
Number of concentrated animal feeding operations 2.8
Ratio of commercial fertilizers to cropland 0.9
Wind erosion above T 4.2
Phosphorus runoff potential 3.9
Riparian areas 0.8
Carbon sequestration 3.6
Coastal zone land 3.6
    Total 100
Note: T is the soil loss tolerance factor (tolerable rate of soil erosion). 
EQIP = Environmental Quality Inventives Program.
Source:  GAO, 2006.29 
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EQIP is subject to a number of Farm Act provisions for meeting distribu-
tional goals that target funds to specific producer types. At EQIP’s inception, 
Congress mandated that 50 percent of funds be used to address resource 
issues on livestock and poultry operations, and this set-aside was raised to 
60 percent in 2002. In 2002, the Farm Act granted favorable payment terms 
to beginning farmers and limited-resource producers, which were extended 
to socially disadvantaged farmers in 2008. The 2008 Farm Act requires 
that 5 percent of EQIP funds first be made available to beginning farmers, 
and another 5 percent to socially disadvantaged producers. States consider 
the set-aside requirements when designing their application processes, but 
because these requirements are easily met, there has been no national require-
ment for each State to set aside a particular percentage of funds. 
Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP)
WHIP was implemented in 1996 to assist landowners with developing or 
improving wildlife habitat on agricultural land. As in EQIP, NRCS allocates 
WHIP funds to State NRCS offices to achieve allocative goals and grants 
States flexibility to tailor the program to meet their individual needs. The 
funding allocated to each State is based on major wildlife-related resource 
priorities identified in Farm Act legislation (table A.2). Unlike EQIP appli-
cations, all WHIP applications are pooled and ranked at the State level, 
although, as with EQIP, States develop their own wildlife habitat priorities, 
sets of conservation practices that can receive funding, and application-
ranking criteria. These ranking criteria include the expected longevity of the 
habitat to be created, parcel size and use, proximity to other, similar habitat 
(agglomeration benefit), cost, and any funding from other sources (USDA-
NRCS, 2004b). As with EQIP, the State priorities and associated weights 
may differ from national priorities upon which the State allocations were 
based.
Table A.2
Factors and weights used to allocate WHIP funds to States
Resource concerns Weight
At-risk wildlife species 20
At-risk wildlife species native habitat 20
Non-Federal acres 10
Total non-Federal acres enrolled in CRP, GRP, WRP 10
Declining grasslands needing restoration 8
Declining forestland needing restoration 7
Declining wetlands needing restoration 7
Aquatic species 8
At-risk aquatic species 10
Total 100
WHIP = Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program; CRP = Conservation Reserve Program;  
GRP = Grassland Reserve Program; WRP = Wetlands Reserve Program.
Source:  GAO, 2006.30
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Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) and Farm and Ranch Lands 
Protection Program (FRPP)
GRP and FRPP provide payments to purchase easements to prevent the 
conversion of grassland (GRP) and farmland (FRPP) to other uses. Like 
EQIP and WHIP, these programs are decentralized and have made funds 
broadly available to producers in all States since program inception (in 1996 
for FRPP, and 2002 for GRP). In both FRPP and GRP, State program offices 
use program funds and make enrollment decisions based on USDA State and 
national resource priorities. However, applications must be sponsored by a 
local entity willing to contribute a portion of the easement cost (i.e., a land 
protection program established by a State or local government or nongov-
ernmental organization). These entities submit parcels for consideration that 
satisfy their own program goals, so ultimately the easements funded through 
FRPP and GRP reflect a combination of national, State, and local priorities.
In FRPP, NRCS has historically made program fund allocations to States 
based on the amount of farmland previously converted to developed uses 
in the State, the risk of further farmland conversions, estimates of land-
owner interest in selling easements in FRPP, and the financial contributions 
and historical performance of cooperating entities that sponsor landowner 
enrollments.17
In GRP, the two agencies responsible for program administration, NRCS 
(for easements) and USDA’s Farm Services Agency (for rental agreements), 
typically allocate program funding to States based on the number of grazing 
operations, pasture, and range acres under threat of conversion, and biodiver-
sity considerations.18 These funds are used to purchase easements, to fund 
long-term rental agreements to maintain grassland cover, and to provide cost-
sharing assistance to restore or install grassland.
  17Farm and Ranch Lands Protection 
Program, Final Rule, Federal Register, 
Vol. 68, no 95, Page 26461-26478, May 
16, 2003. Online at http://edocket.ac-
cess.gpo.gov/2003/03-12064.htm
  18Grassland Reserve Program Final 
Rule, Federal Register, Vol 69, no 99, 
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Appendix B. Marginal Contracts
It may be tempting to estimate the impacts of policy changes based on 
aggregate measures like the “average” contract. However, as the following 
analyses reveal, the characteristics of conservation program contracts vary by 
priority. The underlying differences suggest that estimating impacts of policy 
changes based on the resources or size of the area treated by the “average” 
contract can be misleading. We use a small (10-percent) increase in conser-
vation program budgets as an example to demonstrate how different esti-
mated impacts might be. 
As program budgets or other program factors change, funds allocated to 
each State will change. Marginal contracts (the lowest priority contracts that 
received program funding) and marginally rejected applications (unfunded 
applications with scores just below those of the marginal contracts) will be 
most affected by these budget changes. Figure B.1 illustrates how hypo-
thetical changes in State allocations affect marginal contracts and applica-
tions that offer to treat two problems: erosion and grazing productivity. 
Each dot represents a score based on the application’s expected reduction 
in erosion and improvement in grazing productivity, and each dot’s coordi-
nates in the figure depend on the extent to which the producer agrees to treat 
each problem. The solid line represents the amount of erosion reduction and 
grazing improvements that can be funded with the available budget; it can be 
thought of as a cutoff line. For simplicity, unit costs of treating erosion and 
grazing lands are assumed to be the same for all producers. The olive-green 
dots have the highest scores and are funded contracts (accepted offers), given 
Figure B.1
Increasing program budgets allow more contracts to be funded
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the available budget. The black dots have the lowest scores and are rejected 
applications. The gray dots, those closest to the cutoff line, are the marginal 
contracts and marginally rejected applications. If the budget increases 
slightly (cutoff line moves closer to the origin, as in State A’s figure), appli-
cations with the next highest scores would be funded—they become the 
marginal contracts. When budgets decline slightly (as in State B’s figure), 
the marginal contracts no longer receive funding—they become “marginally 
rejected.” The positions of the dots vary between the two States depicted 
in the figure, reflecting the idea that the mix of problems that producers 
agree to treat varies across States. The locations and slopes of the budget 
lines reflect, respectively, the variation in the size of State budgets and the 
different priorities States place on treating different problems. The impacts 
that relatively small program changes will have on program outcomes will 
depend largely on the characteristics of marginal contracts and marginally 
rejected applications in each State—the number of acres producers agree to 
treat, the payment producers are willing to accept, and the environmental 
benefits they are willing to provide. However, when legislation represents a 
major overhaul of a program, the incentives that producers face will change, 
and consideration of how the set of producers who apply to a program may 
change in response (the number and positions of the dots in the graphs) will 
be important. 
When conservation programs are decentralized and allow for multiple 
jurisdictions to make enrollment decisions, as in EQIP and WHIP, multiple 
ranking tools will be at work in each program. In EQIP, many ranking 
tools can exist within each State. This decisionmaking structure means that 
marginal contracts, and marginally rejected applications, will exist for each 
application pool—potentially yielding a set of marginal contracts and appli-
cations that vary widely in terms of resource problems and costs of treatment. 
How Do Marginal Contracts Differ From Higher Priority Contracts?
Because of the diversity in the resource problems that producers face, the flex-
ibility producers have in deciding which problems to treat, and the few limita-
tions on eligibility for working-land conservation programs, contracts enrolled 
in these programs can vary in many ways. State agencies administering 
conservation programs also affect the characteristics of enrolled contracts 
through the conservation priorities the agencies establish. The process for 
prioritizing applications in a conservation program suggests that differences 
are likely to exist between those of higher priority for enrollment and those 
of lower priority. An obvious difference is that higher priority contracts are 
more likely to address higher priority resource concerns. They may also be 
more likely to address these issues at lower cost, at least in jurisdictions that 
consider per acre treatment costs in the prioritization process. Whether the 
contract addresses concerns arising from livestock operations, or aids particu-
larly disadvantaged producer types, may also differ by contract priority. 
Comparing the characteristics of marginal to higher priority contracts in EQIP 
and WHIP—the financial and cost-share assistance received, the types of 
practices implemented, and the resource concerns addressed—illustrates how 
these contracts vary in programs treating environmental problems on working 
lands. We identified contracts as marginal or not using the contract’s ranking 
score and information about which contracts were pooled and ranked against 33 
The Farm Act’s Regional Equity Provision: Impacts on Conservation Program Outcomes / ERR-98 
Economic Research Service/USDA
each other in the selection process, information which is included in the 
program administrative data maintained by NRCS.19 We defined low-priority 
contracts as those that ranked the lowest in each funding pool, which, in total, 
comprised 10 percent of program funds. Highest priority contracts were those 
that ranked the highest and comprised 10 percent of program funds. 
Marginal contracts differ from higher priority contracts in a number of ways. 
For example, marginal contracts in EQIP received significantly smaller (in 
a statistical sense) contract payments compared with the highest priority 
contracts (table B.1). A regional-level analysis reveals that this pattern held, 
almost without exception, across USDA production regions and over the 
3-year period 2004-06. Contract payments on marginal contracts were lower 
because these contracts tended to receive both lower rates of cost-share 
assistance and smaller financial assistance payments. In EQIP, participants 
receive cost-share assistance to help offset part of the cost of installing struc-
tural or vegetative practices, and financial assistance to adopt more envi-
ronmentally friendly management practices.20 In 2006, the average rate for 
cost-shared practices was 57 percent and 61 percent for marginal and high-
priority contracts, respectively (table B.1). 
Low- and higher priority contracts also differ based on the amount of land 
that receives treatment and types of practices producers agree to implement. 
Analysis of 2006 EQIP contract data reveals that the typical lowest priority 
contract treated fewer acres compared with higher priority contracts, ranging 
from 5 percent fewer acres treated for water quality issues to 84 percent 
fewer acres for fish and wildlife issues. Most EQIP contracts involve imple-
mentation of a single type of practice—in 2006, about 70 percent of all EQIP 
contracts implemented only structural, vegetative, or management practices 
(fig. B.2). Of these contracts, low-priority contracts tended to implement 
strictly structural or vegetative cost-shared practices more frequently than 
higher priority contracts did (50 percent versus 41 percent), while more 
of the highest priority contracts included combinations of practice types. 
Installing conservation “systems” involving multiple practices may be the 
most efficient way to treat a variety of resource problems (Lerch et al., 2005; 
Berry et al., 2003). 
  19Ranking scores reflect the agency’s 
numerical determination of the priority 
for enrolling a particular contract with 
funds from a particular pool, and higher 
ranking scores imply higher priority. 
In a few instances, groups of contracts 
were assigned to one of three priority 
categories (priority = 1st, 2nd, or 3rd). 
We assigned ranks to the lowest priority 
contracts based on costs, consistent 
with the ranking approach in Kansas 
and Mississippi (the two States with 
the most contracts ranked on a priority 
basis). When a contract was missing 
a ranking score, we used regression 
analysis to predict the ranking score 
based on contract characteristics, but 
because the decision and ranking pro-
cesses are so decentralized, this effort 
was not successful even at a State level. 
Thus, we assigned the average ranking 
score from contracts within the relevant 
funding pool to unranked contracts. 
  20In this report we define structural 
practices as practices with a 15-year 
life that are likely to treat multiple 
fields (lagoons, ponds, etc). Vegeta-
tive practices include vegetative filter 
strips, buffers, and small structural 
practices that are likely to treat single 
tracts/fields. Management practices 
include, for example, integrated pest 
management, nutrient management, and 
conservation tillage.
Table B.1







Average contract payment, dollars $11,795  $15,720  -$3,925**
Average percentage rate for  
cost-shared practices
0.57 0.61 -0.04**
Average incentive payment, dollars $2,707  $3,231  -$524**
Number of practices, average 2.63 3.4 -0.77**
Size of commonly adopted practices: 
Fencing, feet  4,216 5,992 -1,776**
Nutrient management, acres 400 341 59**
Pasture and hay planting, acres 51 79 -28** 
**Difference is significant at a 95% confidence level.  
EQUIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program.
Source: USDA-NRCS administrative data for EQIP, 2006. 34
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In recent years, policymakers have sought to improve participation rates by 
certain producer groups in EQIP. For example, the 2002 and 2008 farm legis-
lation provided for higher levels of financial assistance and other measures 
to reduce barriers to participation by beginning farmers and limited-resource 
producers (the 2008 Farm Act includes favorable terms for socially disad-
vantaged farmers, as well). The 2006 enrollment data suggest beginning 
and limited-resource farmers and ranchers tend to get enrollment priority 
in EQIP. When viewed from a national level, 68 percent of payments on 
high-priority contracts are made on contracts held by beginning farmers and 
ranchers, while just 10 percent of payments to low priority contracts are 
received by these farmers (fig. B.3). Payment patterns are similar for limited-
resource producers. 
Marginal Contracts: Implications of Differences  
for Program Analysis
Knowledge about the many ways in which lower and higher priority 
contracts differ can be particularly important for understanding the environ-
mental, economic, distributional, and allocative impacts of policy changes, 
as well as for estimating how program administration requirements (such 
as staffing and provider needs for technical assistance) might change in 
response. Taking this variation into account is important even for relatively 
small program changes. For example, in EQIP, if estimates of impacts of a 
10-percent budget increase on contract numbers were based on the “average” 
contract size rather than the smaller size of marginal contracts, the number 
of additional contracts enrolled would have been understated by 42 percent. 
Further, estimates of the number of acres receiving treatment for plant condi-
tions, soil erosion, soil conditions, and fish and wildlife problems would be 
Figure B.2
Percent of EQIP contracts by practice type and priority
Types of practices defined:
Struct = large structural practices with a 15-year life; Mgmt = management; Veg = vegetative practices and small structural practices 
treating single tracts/fields.
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overstated by more than 40 percent, because marginal contracts tend to treat 
fewer acres than the average contract. 
Understanding differences among contracts by producer type is also impor-
tant, especially when certain producers require additional technical or other 
types of Government assistance. The average EQIP payment to all live-
stock producers was about $21,120 in 2006, while payments for livestock 
producers with marginal contracts were about half as large. If the impacts 
of a 10-percent budget increase were based on the size of the “average” 
contract and livestock contracts continued to receive 66 percent of any addi-
tional funding (the proportion of all funding received by this producer group 
nationally), the number of new livestock contracts that could be enrolled with 
a 10-percent budget increase would be underestimated by about 45 percent. 
The number of contracts with beginning and limited resource farmers would 
also be underestimated by 25 percent, if similar assumptions about contract 
sizes were made.
Figure B.3
Proportion of contract payments to beginning farmers in EQIP, 2006
PB = Pacific Basin Countries; PR = Puerto Rico.
EQIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program.
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Appendix C. Methodology for Estimating Acres  
Receiving Treatment and the Costs per Acre of 
Treating Resource Concerns 
The EQIP and WHIP data we used to estimate treatment costs included the 
cost of implementing each practice, identifiers for the fields where each 
practice was to be installed, indicators of physical effects to be treated, and 
information on how many acres were receiving treatment under the contract, 
as identified by local NRCS field offices. We used these locally determined 
links between costs and environmental problems to estimate watershed-level 
costs of treatment. The advantage of using the locally determined links is that 
they incorporate the natural variation in practice costs across different States, 
which depend on local priorities and circumstances. 
Agricultural producers address resource concerns by implementing conser-
vation practices that mitigate the underlying physical effects of production. 
For example, pasture and hay planting and fencing are practices often used 
to mitigate overgrazing, a physical effect that addresses the resource concern 
of the productivity of grazing land. Often more than one practice is used to 
address a physical effect. Also, some practices, like fencing, can mitigate 
multiple physical effects (e.g., overgrazing and streambank erosion) that 
address more than one resource concern (such as grazing productivity and 
water quality). In developing our cost estimates, we accounted for both the 
multiple-practice and multiple-resource concerns evident in the data. 
The study’s primary goal in developing the cost estimates was to do so 
in such a way that the costs could ultimately be compared to benefits for 
addressing particular resource concerns. Three factors were important: (1) 
linking the physical effects to resource concerns (such as water quality or 
grazing productivity) to develop cost estimates of addressing the concern; 
(2) identifying which costs were incurred to mitigate which physical effects 
(such as soil erosion or grazing land health); and (3) grouping practices based 
on the years of benefits that they were likely to generate. 
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, NRCS field offices could assign practices to 
as many as 76 physical effects, depending on the environmental problem the 
practice was expected to treat. In 2006, NRCS changed and expanded the 
list to include 82 physical effects. For our analysis, we grouped the physical 
effects by resource-concern categories for which we had benefit estimates 
(see Appendix D for a description of benefit estimates). For 2004-2005, 28 of 
the 76 physical effects were mapped to resource concern categories for which 
benefit estimates existed; in 2006, 17 of 82 physical effects were mapped. 
Table C.1 identifies which subsets of physical effects linked to which 
resource concerns. Although the physical effects receiving treatment differed 
somewhat during the study period, we reviewed the data and found reason-
able consistency across years between the practices that were associated with 
particular resource concerns.21
In some cases, the practice-to-physical-effect links in the data appeared 
tenuous—for example, ponds were identified as reducing wind erosion in 
some contracts. In such cases, we imposed restrictions on the data. We paid 
particular attention to large structural practices (e.g., creating ponds, waste 
  21This method puts greater reliance 
on the NRCS field office judgments 
about which resource concerns a prac-
tice is actually intended to address. An 
alternative method, which might ensure 
more consistency across years, would 
be to impose a strict mapping between 
practices and the resource concerns 
they are intended to address. However, 
this alternative would limit the spatial 
variability in the data as well as the 
ability of practices to address multiple 
resource concerns. The spatial variabili-
ty in this study is particularly important 
because we are distinguishing effects of 
the Regional Equity provision among 
different States.37 
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storage facilities, etc.) that were associated with unlikely physical effects and 
that would have the most significant effects on net benefit estimates. In addi-
tion to restrictions on links between large structural practices and particular 
physical effects, the primary restrictions we imposed were on the types of 
practices related to wetland creation and grazing productivity issues (e.g., 
we assumed practices funded through WHIP were not intended to mitigate 
grazing land productivity issues).
To identify the costs of mitigating physical effects, we used the contract data 
to link practices both to the fields on which they were installed and to the 
indicators of physical effects expected to be mitigated by those practices (we 
Table C.1
Physical effects included in benefit categories
Resource concerns
Physical effects receiving treatment
Fiscal 2004, 2005 Fiscal 2006
Benefits from reduced erosion from 
wind and water
Onsite soil productivity benefits Sheet and rill erosion reduction, reduction 
in irrigation-induced soil erosion
Sheet and rill erosion reduction, reduction 
in irrigation-induced soil erosion
Air quality benefits Reduction in wind erosion and particulate 
pollution
Reduction in wind erosion and particu-
late matter less than 10 micrometers in 
diameter
Sedimentation reduction benefits Reduction in damage from sediment 
deposition and erosion from roadsides and 
construction sites; reduction in shoreline 
and streambank erosion; reduction in sedi-
ment deposition
Reduction in damage from sediment de-
position and erosion from road sides and 
construction sites; reduction in shoreline 
and streambank erosion; improvement in 
capacity of conveyances from reducing 
sediment deposition
Water quality benefits Reduction in surface water salinity, sedi-
ment and eutrophication, heavy metals, 
pesticides, acid rain problems, and tem-
perature extremes; reduction in bioaccu-
mulation of toxins; improvement in water for 
fish and wildlife
Reduction in surface water salinity, sedi-
ment and turbidity, heavy metals, pesti-
cides, petroleum and harmful tempera-
tures; rectifying inadequate water for fish 
and wildlife
Grazing productivity benefits Reduction in noxious and invasive plants, 
improvement in rangeland site stability 
Improvement in quantities and quality 
of feed/forage/plants, reduction in nox-
ious and invasive plants, improvement 
in rangeland site stability and hydrologic 
cycle
Irrigation efficiency benefits Improvement in water supply for irrigated 
land
Improvement in efficiency of water use on 
irrigated land
Wildlife viewing benefits Improving population imbalances and spe-
cies diversity, reduction in loss/degradation 
of riparian habitat/vegetation, reduction of 
nonindigenous plant or animal species 
Improving population imbalances, food, 
space, and populations of threatened 
and endangered species and species of 
concern
Hunting benefits 
Reduction in loss/degradation of forest or 
grass cover and habitat fragmentation
Improving cover/shelter for wildlife and 
reducing habitat fragmentation
Wetland creation benefits Reduction of significant hydrological modi-
fication
Reduction in excessive subsurface water
Source: USDA-NRCS administrative data for Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP).38
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assumed that practices completely addressed the identified physical effects 
on all fields where the practice was installed). This yielded cost estimates 
that varied by practice, year, and field level. Most practices were installed on 
a single field, but in some cases they were installed on many fields. In 2004 
and 2005, 79 percent and 87 percent of EQIP contract items were coded to 
three or fewer physical effects, with 46 percent and 66 percent of  contract 
items coded to just one physical effect in those years.
 In generating contract-specific cost estimates, we identified whether the 
physical effect was mitigated using one of seven different practice types or 
combinations of types:  large structural practices, management practices, 
vegetative practices, large structural plus management practices, large struc-
tural plus vegetative practices, management plus vegetative practices, or all 
three types (large structural plus vegetative plus management practices).22 
Distinguishing by practice type allowed us to match costs to varying streams 
of benefits, based on the varying lengths of the useful lives of the practices. 
When estimating the per acre cost of addressing a resource concern, we had 
to account for the fact that multiple practices could be applied to the same 
field without double-counting the acres treated. In cases where practices 
addressed a single resource concern, we estimated the contract cost per 
acre (CPA) of addressing resource concern r with all practices of type P by 
summing up the costs of each practice cp over the t years implemented, and 
dividing by the number of acres a the practices are estimated to treat on j 


















Ideally, data would be available on the number of acres treated by individual 
practices (a). Because acreage data are only available at the contract level, we 
estimated the acreage treated by each practice on field j (aj) by allocating the 
total acres treated by the contract across all the fields that were subject to treat-
ment by any practice. Some practices within a contract may be implemented 
on fewer fields than others, so total treated acres (TTA) are divided by the 
maximum number of fields receiving treatment by any practice in the contract:
  aj = TTA/argmax(j),
which assumes all fields treated by a contract are of equal size.
The above formulas assume that practices are implemented to address a 
single resource concern. In some cases, practices address multiple physical 
effects that map to multiple resource concerns. These cases raise the question 
of how to allocate practice costs across multiple concerns. Most practices are 
implemented to address a primary physical effect, so a reasonable strategy 
would be to allocate some costs to that effect. For this analysis, we allocated 
practice costs by apportioning them equally across the physical effects being 
mitigated by the practice. 
  22We define vegetative practices to 
include small structural practices that 
are likely to treat particular fields or 
tracts, as opposed to large structural 
practices that are more likely to treat 
physical effects on all fields.39 
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As a sensitivity check, we also analyzed how outcomes would change if 
practice costs and treated acres were allocated entirely to the “primary” 
physical effect treated by the practice. We estimated the primary effect based 
on which physical effect each practice treated most frequently. We calculated 
the primary physical effect by practice within each State, which maintained 
spatial variation across States in the practice-physical effect mappings. With 
costs for addressing physical effects calculated this way, our estimates of the 
impacts of the Regional Equity provision on net benefits differed from our 
results when we apportioned costs equally across all physical effects being 
addressed by the practice, but not in any predictable way. The net benefits 
for some resource concerns increased, while others decreased up to several 
hundred thousand dollars. This suggests that assumptions about how costs 
are allocated when multiple resource concerns are treated can affect the 
outcomes.
Accounting for Outliers in the Data
One issue that arose in calculating the cost per acre for each resource concern 
was that for some contracts, the cost per acre estimates were unreasonably 
high or low. In large part, these outliers were due to inconsistencies in how 
field offices entered data on the acres that received treatment. The primary 
problem was that the number of acres on which the practice was installed 
was reported as “treated acres.” For example, a riparian buffer installed on 
0.2 acres was listed as treating 0.2 acres, when it actually treated (prevented 
soil erosion from leaving) a 20-acre field. This type of inconsistency resulted 
in cost per acre estimates that were unreasonably high. In other cases, 
certain practices were recorded as treating tens of thousands of acres. While 
possible, practices treating such large acreages are not typical, and they result 
in unreasonably low cost per acre estimates. Because calculations of average 
per acre costs at aggregated levels are affected by outliers, we used median 
per acre costs, or the per acre estimates for which half the observations lie 
below the estimate and half lie above (when the per acre cost estimates are 
arranged in order of magnitude).
Summarizing per Acre Costs to the Watershed Level
To be consistent with benefit estimates that varied across watersheds (8-digit 
Hydrologic Unit Codes, or HUCs delineated by the U.S. Geological Survey), 
we summarized the cost data to the watershed level. For each resource 
concern r and practice group p, we calculated the watershed level cost per 
acre as the median cost per acre of contracts in that HUC that treat resource 
concern r with practice group p. We also used the median number of acres 
treating resource concern r, multiplied by the number of contracts treating 
resource concern r, to estimate the number of acres receiving treatment. 40
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Appendix D. Benefit Estimates
The benefits from addressing resource concerns were estimated for each 
contract. We estimated these by linking the physical effects addressed in each 
contract to different benefit categories for which benefit values are avail-
able from the literature (see Appendix C, table C.1, for a description of how 
physical effects were mapped to benefit categories). These categories include 
benefits associated with erosion reduction (soil productivity, dust, sedimen-
tation, water quality), improved water management (irrigation efficiency), 
grazing land productivity, and habitat creation and improvement (hunting, 
wildlife viewing, wetlands). Most of the procedures and data behind the 
benefit estimates are the same as those used in the benefit assessment of the 
Conservation Security Program (USDA, 2004a). 
Benefit estimates for each category were available at several different 
geographic levels (Hydraulic Unit Code, State, farm production region, or 
national). GIS procedures were used to aggregate benefits to the State level. 
Benefits were placed on a per ton of erosion or per acre basis, depending 
on the category. Benefits from Environmental Quality Incentives Program  
contracts were estimated by applying the per unit values to the amount of 
erosion reduced or the number of acres treated.
Benefits From Reduced Erosion
Benefits from reduced water and wind erosion were obtained from Hansen 
and Ribaudo (2008),  who provide economic measures of soil conservation 
benefits for a variety of benefit categories, representing benefits from reduced 
sedimentation, improved water quality, improved air quality, and improved 
soil productivity. Benefits are provided in terms of dollars per ton of erosion 
reduced, by county and the U.S. Geological Survey’s 8-digit Hydrologic 
Regions (although the benefits for sub-State units are often assigned the per 
ton benefit estimated at a State or regional level). 
In the case of erosion reductions, contract data did not contain any infor-
mation on baseline erosion rates or the expected change in the rates. We 
assumed that practices adopted for the purpose of reducing erosion would 
achieve a reduction equal to the difference between the HUC-wide average 
erosion rate (tons per acre) on cropland eroding at T and more than T. T is 
the “acceptable” level of erosion as defined by NRCS (in tons per acre) and 
a standard target for erosion control practices. Cropland already at or near 
T would not need conservation practices to control erosion. We estimated 
HUC-wide average erosion rates with data from the National Resources 
Inventory on cropland with an erosion rate greater than T, and used this 
information to convert the benefits from reducing erosion on a per ton basis 
to a per acre basis.
Benefits From Improved Water Management  
Benefits from improved water management represent the reduced cost to the 
farmer of water used in irrigation. Estimates of annual per acre water savings 
were obtained from NRCS (USDA-NRCS, 2004a). In that study, the assump-
tion was made that improved water management reduces water use by about 41 
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13 percent. Potential per acre benefits were calculated using data on irrigation 
water use, water source (surface or ground), and irrigation water costs. 
Benefits From Improved Grazing Productivity  
Improved land management can increase the productivity of grazing lands. 
We used per acre productivity benefit estimates developed by NRCS at 
the multistate level for an analysis of the Conservation Security Program 
(USDA- NRCS, 2004a). Benefit estimates were developed by varying the 
national per acre values ($15.01 for pasture, $5.00 for grazing) across HUCs, 
based on relative soil productivity measures obtained from the NRI. Separate 
benefits were calculated for rangeland and pastureland. Where watersheds 
contained both rangeland and pastureland, we calculated the benefits for 
the HUCs as the weighted average benefit. We used the number of acres in 
rangeland and pastureland in the watershed, estimated using 1997 NRI data, 
as weights. 
Benefits From Improved Hunting Opportunities  
Improving wildlife habitat can produce hunting and wildlife-viewing bene-
fits. We obtained estimates of the value of improved pheasant hunting from 
a study by Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen (1999). Their study derived 
estimates by applying a Random Utility Model of pheasant hunter behavior 
(Hansen, Feather, and Shank, 1999). Recreation data for the model were 
from the 1991 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated 
Recreation, and land-use data were taken from the 1992 NRI. For purposes 
of the present study, we reduced the benefit estimates by 50 percent, on 
the assumption that land remaining in production would generate half the 
benefits of land that is retired in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
(USDA-NRCS, 2004a).
Benefits From Wildlife Viewing  
The 1999 study by Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen estimated the impact 
of the CRP on nonconsumptive, wildlife-oriented recreation. In that study, 
data from the Hunting and Fishing Survey (U.S. Department of the Interior 
and U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993, 1997) were used to estimate 
how improvements in habitat affected the number of trips people took to 
view wildlife and the value of a trip in each region. Results were reported 
on a basis of per acre of-land in the CRP. Several studies have shown that a 
number of practices funded through EQIP have benefited wildlife, including 
irrigation water savings practices (which benefited the arctic grayling fish 
species in Montana and Wyoming), conservation tillage (which benefited 
nesting birds) and rangeland practices (which benefited the prairie grouse) 
(e.g., Riley 2004; Martin and Forsyth 2003; Lokemoen and Beiser, 1997; and 
Jahn and Schenck 1991). 
Benefits From Wetland Creation  
Wetland restoration can provide habitat for wildlife species that support 
recreational activities, such as hunting and fishing, and commercial activities 
such as fishing and trapping. Wetlands also have a nonuse value, primarily 
for the viewing of wildlife that depend on wetlands for nesting, cover, and 42
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food. We applied annualized recreation, commercial, and nonuse values 
for wetlands of $550 per acre based on values reported in the literature 
(Heimlich et al., 1998). 
Applying Benefit Estimates to Practices
Table 4 reports the annual per acre benefit estimates used to estimate the 
impacts of the Regional Equity provision on net benefits. We took into 
account that the practices implemented under an EQIP or WHIP contract 
produce benefits over multiple years, and using a 7-percent discount rate, 
we calculated the present value of the benefit stream for each contract. We 
allowed the length of the benefit stream to depend on the types of practices 
(management or structural) and the length of the contract (Table D.1). We 
applied estimates of practice lives reported by NRCS (2004): structural prac-
tices generate a 15-year stream of benefits, vegetative practices (buffers) 
generate a 10-year stream, and management practices generate a 4-year 
stream. No benefits were assumed to be generated in the initial year of imple-
menting the practice establishment. An implicit assumption with this approach 
is that installed practices mitigate physical effects to a nondegradation level. If 
they do not, the benefits ascribed to the practices will be overstated.
Many participants agree to implement a suite of practices to mitigate a single 
physical effect. We assumed that all the practices would need to be in place 
in order for the contract to generate all of the benefits from conservation treat-
ment. If, for example, both structural and management practices were used to 
mitigate a physical effect on the same land unit, we assumed that both types 
of practices were necessary to treat the land to a nondegradation level. For 
contracts that combined structural and management practices, we assumed 
that benefits from structural practices were reduced by 25 percent once the 
management practices ended after 3 years. For contracts that combined 
structural and vegetative practices, we assumed that benefits from structural 
practices were reduced by 25 percent once the vegetative practices finished 
their useful life after year 10. If both vegetative and management practices 
were implemented, we assumed that the benefits from vegetative practices 
were reduced by 25 percent once the management practices were no longer 
implemented (after 4 years). If all three types of practices were implemented, 
we assumed that total benefits were reduced by 15 percent between years 4 
and 10 when the management practice was no longer implemented, and by 25 
percent when only the structural practice was in place after year 10.43 
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Table D.1
Portion of benefits generated by contract type, by year
Practice type
Struct. Mgmt. Veg. Struct. + Mgmt. Struct. + Veg. Mgmt.+ Veg. Struct+Mgmt+Veg
Benefits in year 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Benefits in year 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Benefits in year 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Benefits in year 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Benefits in year 5 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.85
Benefits in year 6 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.85
Benefits in year 7 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.85
Benefits in year 8 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.85
Benefits in year 9 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.85
Benefits in year 10 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.75
Benefits in year 11 1 0.75 0.75 0.75
Benefits in year 12 1 0.75 0.75 0.75
Benefits in year 13 1 0.75 0.75 0.75
Benefits in year 14 1 0.75 0.75 0.75
Benefits in year 15 1 0.75 0.75 0.75
Note:  A value equal to 1 means full benefits are assumed to be generated in that year.
Types of practices defined:
Struct = Large structural practices with a 15-year life.
Mgmt = Management.
Veg   = Vegetative practices and small structural practices treating single tracts/fields.
Source:  ERS analysis of NRCS contract data.  